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Abstract. In recent years the United States has turned to digital technologies to buoy its
response to anti-Americanism in the so-called ‘Muslim world.’ At least three concepts
appear to be shaping this effort. The first is a marketing-based strategy called
‘engagement.’ The other two are derivations of Marshall McLuhan’s ‘global village’ and
his aphorism that ‘the medium is the message.’ This paper focuses on the uses and
misuses of McLuhan’s work by foreign policy officials in Washington. It argues that their
stated purpose – to empower people and further inter-cultural understanding through
dialogue – is dubious. Indeed, pronouncements regarding these potentials now sit
uncomfortably alongside Washington’s use of these same technologies to manage dissent.
By assessing digital engagement and a more general initiative called ‘internet freedom’
(both in the light of what McLuhan, in fact, says), American aspirations involving digital
communications are shown to be more than just contradictory; they are dangerously
misguided.

What if the way we perceive a problem is part of the problem? What if the way we
spontaneously formulate a problem mystifies the problem?
-- Slavoj Žižek1

An enthusiasm for almost everything ‘digital’ has crept into the formulations of
American foreign policy officials.2 Beyond post-Cold War allusions to the rising

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their helpful critiques as well as
Hamilton Bean for his generous contributions. Thank you to James Compton for his input
on an earlier draft. Special thanks are extended to Robert Babe for his insights and
guidance, especially his help in the task of unraveling the complexities of McLuhan’s
thought.
1
Slavoj Žižek, Lecture at the London School of Economics, 3 July 2011, available online
at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cW1zUh94uMY>
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importance of “soft power,”3 a more recent interest in digitalized communications is
being expressed through a Department of State initiative called ‘internet freedom.’
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, “the world of MySpace is creating a global world of
‘OurSpace,’ linking hundreds of millions of individuals across continents.”4 In a
“networked world,” she writes, “the U.S. has the potential to be the most connected
country ... [T]he U.S.’s exceptional capacity for connection ... will renew its power and
restore its global purpose.”5
A core concept informing such assertions is Marshall McLuhan’s prophesy, first
articulated more than fifty years ago, that the world is becoming a global village. For
McLuhan, this ‘village’ is the outcome of the speeding up of social relations through the
use of electronic media and how this acceleration affects both the material and perceived
integration of space. It is, he says, communicative speed that breaks down barriers
between the local and the global, private and public, proximity and distance. Thus, for
McLuhan, the global village constitutes an experiential reality – one that mimics a sense
of universal immediacy.
In this paper, I argue that a prima facie case can be made demonstrating
McLuhan’s influence on contemporary thinking in relation to an ascendant global

An example of this borderline Utopianism is James Lull’s “The Open Spaces of Global
Communication,” Revista Fronteiras – Estudos Midiáticos 11:2 (May-AugUst 2009), pp.
148-58; for another that is more germane to students of foreign policy, see Clay Shirky,
“The Political Power of Social Media,” Foreign Affairs 90:1 (January-February 2011),
pp. 28-41.
3
Joseph Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs
75:2 (March-April 1996), pp. 20-36.
4
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge, Power in the Networked Century,” Foreign
Affairs 88:1 (January-February 2009), pp. 98.
5
Ibid, p. 113.
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village.6 Herein I assess the use and misuse of McLuhan’s work by the Obama
administration and the United States Department of State in the context of two policy
initiatives – digital engagement and ‘internet freedom.’ To do this I first contextualize
both in terms of Washington’s response to anti-Americanism after 9/11 as it initially was
expressed through efforts by the Bush administration to ‘re-brand’ America and, more
recently, in terms of the Obama administration’s embrace of social media as a means of
engaging foreign Muslims directly. This section constitutes a necessary (largely
descriptive) overview of policy developments since 2001 and, as such, readers already
familiar with this recent history may want to skip these pages. Second, I start relating
what is addressed in the first section to McLuhan’s work, stressing the predominance of
simplistic or inaccurate interpretations. And third, I use writings by and interviews with
McLuhan to critique these policy applications, concluding that the misguided (or perhaps
disingenuous) use of his work may yield contradictory (if not dark) outcomes.
As implied by the questions posed by Slavoj Žižek quoted above, there appears to
be an inability (or unwillingness) among foreign policy officials to recognize the
complexities and ambiguities of the global village, the medium is the message, and some
of McLuhan’s other key ideas. Indeed, perhaps Washington’s very understanding of the
This thinking or ‘reality’ constitutes a largely constructed, inter-subjective way of
understanding the world. Although in this paper the space needed to specify how this has
taken place is limited, there are several possible explanations as to why the global village
concept (or metaphor) resonated in the context of perceived and experiential changes. For
one thing, in the 1960s McLuhan’s writings became widely known (but not well
understood) through his participation in innumerable mass media interviews, references
to him on primetime television shows such as Laugh In, and by appearing as himself in
the academy award winning film Annie Hall. For another, a renewed interest in his
prognostications, especially among Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, emerged when he was
named Wired Magazine’s “patron saint” in 1996. See Gary Wolf, “The Wisdom of Saint
Marshall, the Holy Fool,” Wired Magazine Iss. 4.01 (January 1996), available online at
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive//4.01/saint.marshal.html?topic=&topic_set>
6

3

nature of anti-American extremism itself is delusional – delusional in ways that
McLuhan, I think, would not find surprising.7

America’s Embrace of Digital Communications

Over the past twenty years foreign policy analysts and officials in Washington generally
have come to embrace digital communications. In the 1990s the Clinton administration
promoted what it called a global information infrastructure – an integrated transnational
system involving trade-based information flow guarantees and intellectual property rights
promoted as means of realizing the competitive advantages of particular American firms
(such as Microsoft) and, more generally, production process efficiencies for an array of
corporations.8 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, such an infrastructure came to be
regarded as essential for monitoring potential enemies (through surveillance), waging
rapidly deployed multi-front military campaigns and, eventually, developing more
sophisticated means of modifying anti-Americanism through new techniques using what
the State Department calls public diplomacy and the Pentagon refers to as strategic
communications.9
Among the agencies involved in these activities, a new approach, inspired in part
7

Elsewhere, I address other aspects of delusional thinking in American foreign policy.
See Edward A. Comor, Consumption and the Globalization Project (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), esp. ch. 6. Also see Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean,
“America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion: Critiquing a Public Diplomacy Consensus,”
International Communication Gazette 74:3 (April 2012), pp. 203-220.
8
Edward A. Comor, Communication, Commerce and Power (London: Macmillan, 1998).
9
Public diplomacy is a term used to describe the efforts by state officials to win support
and a favorable image among the publics of other countries whereas strategic
communications refer to efforts, mostly by military and intelligence officials, to modify
an opponent's opinions and actions in light of particular military or strategic interests.
4

at least by developments in marketing, has become dominant. For marketers,
‘engagement’ involves the use digital technologies in the process of impelling potential
customers to take part in producing elements of their own consumption (including their
participation in developing brands). “Every consumer,” wrote management consultant
Don Tapscott in 1996, “on the information highway becomes a producer by creating and
sending a message to a colleague, contributing to a ... discussion group, ... test driving a
virtual car.”10
A turning point in conceptualizing the foreign policy applications of engagement
came one month after 9/11 when advertising executive Charlotte Beers was asked to ‘rebrand’ the United States. In 2002 Beers instituted what she called America’s “shared
values” campaign. It sought to demonstrate to Muslims in other countries that they have
the same values as Americans – values, it was emphasized, shared by all “civilized”
peoples: a respect for democracy, liberty, and private property.11 Secretary of State Colin
Powell, in explaining Beers’s appointment to Congress, argued that “[t]here is nothing
wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something. We are selling a
product. We need someone who can re-brand American foreign policy.”12
Soon after the campaign began, however, according to the Pew Global Attitudes
Project and other public opinion studies, it became clear that Beers had failed.13 Among

10

Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked
Intelligence (New York: McGraw-Hill 1996), p. 63.
11
White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Washington, DC: National Security Council, 2002), available online at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>
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Quoted in Naomi Klein, “America is Not a Hamburger,” The Guardian, 14 March
2002, available online at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/mar/14/marketingandpr.comment>
13
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Pew Global Attitudes Project:
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other problems, what “shared values” implied – a mutual set of beliefs on which to
pursue some kind of inter-cultural dialogue – in practice involved a mostly one-way
monologue about America’s tolerance. More problematic was the disconnect between the
campaign’s assertions and continuing support for regimes that had little interest in human
rights, civil liberties, or economic justice. Such miscalculations continued for most of the
Bush years, improving only in the latter months of the President’s second term when the
administration began to promote the use of digital technologies by ‘moderate’ voices in
the Muslim world. This shift was an attempt to empower ‘tolerant’ people, enabling them
to sidestep the ‘radical’ views being exchanged (it was assumed) in mosques, coffee
shops, and on ‘the Muslim street.’14 According to the United States Government
Accountability Office, over its two terms, the Bush administration spent $10 billion on
public diplomacy but had little to show for it.15
The Obama White House and Department of State under Hillary Clinton
subsequently solicited the expertise of the largest internet and social media corporations
in the United States, including Google and Facebook. By early-2010, digital engagement
and a more general policy called ‘internet freedom’ had become pillars of President
Obama’s foreign policy. This embrace of digital communications also was influenced by
corporations who sought help from Washington to combat censorship and other costly
interventions by foreign states. Arguably, President Clinton’s promotion of a global

Views of a Changing World,” June 2003, available online at <http://people-press.org/>
14
James Glassman, “Winning the War of Ideas,” speech before the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 8 July 2008, available online at
<http://newcentrist.wordpress.com/2008/07/23/james-k-glassman-winning-the-war-ofideas/>
15
United States Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues
for Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: G.A.O., 2009), p. 2.
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information infrastructure in the 1990s (and, before this, America’s post-1945 efforts to
institutionalize, in international law, what was called ‘the free flow of information’) has
come full circle with Hillary Clinton’s similarly corporate-influenced support for
‘internet freedom.’ Here it is helpful to quote her at length on what kinds of freedom this
entails:

… we believe it’s critical that … Users [of the internet] are assured certain basic
freedoms. Freedom of expression is first among them…

The freedom of worship Usually involves the rights of individuals to commune or
not commune with their Creator… The internet can help bridge divides between
people of different faiths… And as we look for ways to expand dialogue, the
internet holds out such tremendous promise…

A connection to global information networks is like an on-ramp to modernity…
Information networks have become a great leveler, and we should use them
together to help lift people out of poverty and give them a freedom from want…

The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It
allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate...16

Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” United States Department of State,
21 January 2010, available online at
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>
16
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As implied, this initiative constitutes a sweeping effort to forge the international
norms needed to allow individuals ready access to the internet.17 “Internet freedom,” says
Clinton, “supports the peace and security that provides a foundation for global
progress.”18
‘Internet freedom’ appears to flow directly out of engagement. After all, dialogue
and the open exchange of information seem to go hand in hand while both are
fundamentally important if people are to feel respected, listened to, and directly involved
in at least some aspects of United States foreign policy.19 However, beyond the rhetoric,
rather than promoting an endless multiplicity of conversations and hoping these will yield
positive outcomes, ‘internet freedom’ is more concerned with defending the private
property of Google, Facebook, and other United States-based companies.20 Moreover, its

Of course corporations whose businesses facilitate ‘internet freedom’ systemically and
consciously restrict or frame such freedoms. To use a Habermasian example, their
entrenched commercial priorities structurally limit the qualitative dimensions of the
discourses that are enabled. A specific example of a corporation’s political orientations
and interdependencies in relation to the American state is Apple’s rejection of an iPhone
app that tracks United States drone strikes. According to Apple, the app was refused
because “many people were likely to find the content objectionable.” UAV News, “Apple
Shoots Down Drone Strike Tracking iPhone App,” SpaceWar.com, 30 August 2012,
available online at
<http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Apple_shoots_down_drone_strike_tracking_iPhone_
app_999.html>
18
Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom”
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>
19
Contradicting this push for free speech and openness are United States efforts to shut
down perhaps the world’s best known online ‘whistle blowing’ organization –
WikiLeaks.
20
Although ‘internet freedom’ has been couched in ways that champion freedom of
speech and civil liberties, its institutionalization coincided with China’s interference with
Google’s private property in the form of state agencies hacking into Google computers in
2009. Prior to this, at least four United States-based transnational corporations cooperated with Chinese censorship requirements – Cisco, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google.
See Jonathan Fenby, “Google blazes a trail with China rift,” The Guardian, 13 January
2010, available online at
17
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implied opening up of a dialogue with and among oppressed people worldwide is meant
to be more strategic than free flowing; more a foreign policy calculation than an openended exploration.21 According to foreign policy analysts Kristin Lord and Mark Lynch,
engagement itself entails

… a planned process, based on a carefully researched understanding of the
audience and of its interests, couched in language calibrated to engage the
audience in the intended manner, using the best one- or two-way method of
engagement … as part of a larger strategy, and evaluated to determine if it is
successful in advancing ... intended goals” [emphases added].22

The official who introduced digital engagement was Bush’s last Undersecretary of
State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James Glassman. “The U.S. need not be
Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas,” said Glassman; “We just need to make
moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us.”23 With this in mind, Glassman
recognized the internet to be an under-utilized means of interacting with audiences,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jan/13/google-chinapolitics-censorship?INTCMP=SRCH>
21
Comor and Bean, “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion,” p. 204.
22
Kristin Lord, and Mark Lynch, America’s Extended Hand: Assessing the Obama
Administration’s Global Engagement Policy (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, 2010), p. 11. As Obama’s first Undersecretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale, told Congress, “We must create an
institutional framework that can take full advantage of new media, with an understanding
that these new tools must be carefully tailored to particular circumstances and always
used in the service of a larger strategy.” Judith McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Confirmation Hearing,” 13 May 2009, available online at
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm>
23
James Glassman, “It’s not about Us,” Foreign Policy, 1 September 2009, available
online at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/01/its_not_about_Us.>
9

linking selected organizations from around the world in order to support those elements
of civil society that have ‘moderate’ political agendas.
The State Department launched its primary public diplomacy website, called
America.gov, in January 2008. In early-2011, however, it was shut down and State
Department efforts to reach foreign publics have since been decentralized to United
States embassies, consulates, and missions which now sponsor over four hundred social
media sites using Facebook and Twitter.24 Beginning in 2009, the Department launched
its X-Life cell phone games (whose slogan is “bridging cultures one pixel at a time”) that,
according to their creators, allow users to “experience the dynamism and vitality of
American life” by “projecting the fundamental values that Americans cherish: tolerance,
freedom, and respect for cultural and religious differences.”25 Also active is the
Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs. It hosts training “webinars”
on social media best practices.26
These and other efforts to promote digital engagement entail two significant
themes. First, they signal a paring back of earlier goals – moving foreign
communications policy away from converting almost everyone harboring anti-American
24

As of the end of 2011, the State Department says it has thirteen million followers on
Facebook and another two million on Twitter. Lizzy Tomei, “Anti-US protests and the
challenges of ‘21st century statecraft’,” Global Post, 25 September 2012, available online
at < http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/unitedstates/120921/anti-us-protests-test-21st-century-statecraft>
Helle Dale, “Public Diplomacy 2.0: Where the United States Government Meets ‘New
Media’,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #2346, 8 December 2009, available online
at <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/public-diplomacy-2-0-where-theUS-government-meets-new-media>
26
Alicia M. Cohn, “State Department shifts digital resources to social media,”
The Hill, 27 December 2011, available online at <http://thehill.com/blogs/hilliconvalley/technology/157501-state-dept-shifts-digital-resources-to-socialmedia?page=2#comments>
25
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views toward, instead, a more targeted (marketing) effort. Rather than communicating to
a mass audience, Glassman’s brief tenure sparked a shift to engaging those already
inclined to reject anti-American violence; at least those who have access to digital media
(especially the young and literate). Successful marketing strategies almost always direct
their communications at a limited number of prospective customers, particularly those
with whom one’s message likely will resonate. Glassman – himself a former business
journalist – also espoused a technique called “diversion” – “the channeling of potential
recruits away from violence with the attractions of entertainment, culture, … [and]
sports...”27 (Glassman 2008).
A second theme involves the promotion of what Hillary Clinton calls ‘Civil
Society 2.0’ – a virtual civil society that reflects and constructs a functioning public
sphere within and among Muslim communities. In addition to being a vague analogy to
discourses concerning an (interactive) ‘Web 2.0’, Clinton also (and, again, vaguely)
implies that, above all else, that the ‘Muslim world’ yearns to develop ‘moderate’
associations and communities, that digital technologies can be used to respond to this
yearning, and that such communicative capacities will enable people to transcend the
persistent political-cultural influence of anti-Western extremism.28

Engagement, ‘Truth’ and McLuhan’s Medium Theory

James Glassman, “Winning the War of Ideas,” The Sun, 23 July 2008, accessed at
<http://www.nysun.com/opinion/winning-the-war-of-ideas/82438/>
28
Readers interested in pursuing a critique of such policies may be interested in Evgeny
Morozov’s The Net Delusion (New York : Public Affairs, 2011). For a thoughtful
analysis of the internet’s role in the development of a transnational public sphere, see
Elisabeth Chaves, “The Internet as Global Platform? Grounding the Magically Levitating
Public Sphere,” New Political Science, 32:1 (March 2010), pp. 23-41.
27
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McLuhan’s nuanced definition of the global village, presented at the outset, has not been
used by either the Bush or Obama administrations (at least not publicly). For them, the
global village instead constitutes a straightforward metaphor – describing a world
characterized by the ubiquity of instantaneous electronic communications. This village is
more a fact than an ambiguous or contradictory process, and it is in this one-dimensional
context that officials have situated their policy initiatives. Before we critique this position
in light of McLuhan’s own work, let us more directly link engagement and ‘internet
freedom’ to official Washington’s understanding of the global village.
Glassman’s successor, Judith McHale – the former Chief Executive Officer of the
Discovery Channel – emphasized two tasks. The first was what she referred to as “a
critical component of … effective mass communication” – “market research.”29 The
second involves the need to apply digital communications in ways that “engage people
directly.”30 Just as social media platforms have been developed in response to the needs
of marketers and advertisers,31 such technological applications can be, according to
McHale, “a game changer … [as they provide] the opportunity to move from an old
paradigm, in which our government speaks as one to many, to a new model of engaging

Quoted in Ed Feulner, “The battle for public opinion,” The Gaffney Ledger, 31
December 2009, available online at <http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2009-1231/Columns/GUEST_COLUMNIST.html>
30
Judith McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign Relations Committee Confirmation
Hearing,” 13 May 2009, available online at
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm>
31
Detlev Zwick, Samuel Bonsu and Aaron Darmodt, “Putting Consumers to Work,”
Journal of Consumer Culture 8:2 (July 2008), pp. 163-196; Vincent Manzerolle,
“Mobilizing the Audience Commodity,” Ephemera, 10:3/4 (2010), pp. 455-69.
29
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interactively and collaboratively across lines that might otherwise divide...”32
To repeat, the antecedent of this ‘game changing’ strategy stemmed from a
different set of problems – problems faced by private sector interests. Among these was a
growing cynicism among consumers who had become increasingly distrustful of
commercial promotions and their (often dubious) promises. Another was the outcome of
an ever more cluttered promotional environment, making it more difficult for marketers
and advertisers to reach targeted audiences. A third hurdle (one more directly facing
public relations firms) involved a paradox: in an emerging information-rich society, the
circulation, mostly through the internet, of harmful facts, costly rumors and, occasionally,
outright fabrications had become almost commonplace.33 A prospective solution to these
problems was to apply digital technologies in ways that would engage people directly –
engaging them through inter-active, participatory, and ego-enhancing activities crafted to
encourage positive associations with products and brands.34
This use of technology resonated with post-9/11 concerns about legitimizing
American policies overseas. To quote one of the State Department’s consultants,
Facebook executive Elliot Schrage,

… the question is how do you build an audience? How do you establish a
community of interests? That’s as true for the maker of laundry detergent as it is
for someone who has a stimulus package for economic growth. … [I]t’s about

McHale, “Testimony at Senate Foreign Relations Committee”
<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/124155.htm>
33
Carl H. Botan and Maureen Taylor, “Public Relations: State of the Field,” Journal of
Communication, 54:4 (December 2004), pp. 645-661.
34
Zwick et al., “Putting Consumers to Work,” pp. 168-71.
32
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communicating a message, finding a community, and building that community,
engaging that community. So, do I see Facebook as being an incredibly valuable
tool for public diplomacy? Absolutely.35

“21st-century statecraft,” reports The New York Times, “is not mere corporate rebranding – swapping tweets for broadcasts. It [constitutes] ... a way to amplify traditional
diplomatic efforts, develop tech-based policy solutions and encourage cyberactivism.”36
Applications include following Barack Obama on Twitter, participating in a virtual town
hall meeting with Hillary Clinton, or debating a particular policy in a chat room hosted by
the State Department. Another example is the annual “Democracy Challenge” video
competition. Visitors to www.videochallenge.america.gov are asked to create a short
video that completes the phrase “Democracy is…’’ Winners receive a trip to Washington,
New York, and Hollywood “to attend gala screenings” of their videos that, it promises,
will give successful contestants “exposure to the U.S. film and television industry and
[the opportunity to] meet with creative talent, democracy advocates and government
leaders.”
There are also covert applications for digital engagement. For example, the
Obama administration has been constructing a “shadow internet” engineered to enable
dissidents in selected countries to circumvent state monitoring and censorship,
particularly through the use of cell phone networks that only American officials can

35

Elliot Schrage, Interview, CFR.org, 11 May 2009, available online at
<www.cfr.org/publication/19300/new_media_tools_and_public_diplomacy.html>
36
Jesse Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy,” The New York Times, 16 July 2010, available
online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=state_department>
14

activate.37 Another involves the utilization of Facebook, Twitter, and other sites using
fake online identities – applying what is called “sock puppet” software – to influence
seemingly frank and open deliberations in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Pashto. Virtual
private servers located in other counties are used to further the impression that the false
personas are genuine.38 More generally, by encouraging people to network with ‘friends’
through monitored websites, precise data also can be generated on the views and
associations of participants.
Just as marketers are not engaging audiences primarily to act on their preferences,
the use of digital engagement by American officials is not about conversing with others
before constructing policies (the hesitant and inconsistent responses by the United States
to popular uprisings in the Middle East underlines this point). Having said this, however,
even if we take Obama administration claims about its efforts to promote a digital
dialogue at face value, these entail a number of dubious assumptions. One is the notion
that a relatively open exchange of information will lead to inter-cultural understanding; at
least the kind of understanding that will complement United States interests. In the words
of Judith McHale, “a key part of what we're trying to do, [is] to really have people engage
with each other, to learn about each other.”39 However, as former United States

James Glanz and John Markoff, “US Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors,”
The New York Times, 12 June 2011, available online at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html?_r=4&pagewanted=1>
38
Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: U.S. spy operation that manipulates social
media” The Guardian, 17 March 2011, available online at
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/Us-spy-operation-socialnetworks?INTCMP=SRCH>
39
Quoted in Alice Johnson, “Public diplomacy critical in information age, Interview with
Judith McHale,” gulfnews.com, 11 November 2011, available online at
<http://gulfnews.com/news/world/Usa/public-diplomacy-critical-in-information-age1.710512>
37
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Information Agency official Bruce Gregory points out, “Shared understandings may not
overcome deep disagreement on interests and issues. Exchanges [and more contemporary
modes of engagement] may reinforce hostilities and competing values, particularly if
others experience an America that is myopic, hubristic, and uninformed about the
world.”40
Secretary Clinton, of course, recognizes the many deleterious implications of
some digital technology applications such as those used by organized crime or, from her
perspective, the security threats stemming from the activities of WikiLeaks. The
hypocrisy of this view becomes apparent, however, in light of the debatable legality of
the American state’s parallel use of the internet to strengthen its surveillance and ‘cyberwar’ capabilities. Indeed, while digital engagement aims to leverage social media and
other internet-mediated communications in ways that impel audiences to persuade
themselves to reject anti-Western extremism, ultimately Washington’s embrace of
engagement is misplaced and contradictory – misplaced and contradictory because the
political-cultural capacities that officials seek to develop (in accordance with a surfacelevel reading of McLuhan) are (when a more precise reading is applied) more likely to
yield opposite results.
Glassman, testifying to Congress in March 2010, stressed the futility of preaching
or “telling the world how wonderful we are.” A more effective means of communicating,
he explained, “is through the generation of a wide and deep conversation. Our role in that
conversation is as facilitator and convener.” He went on to stress that
Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy and strategic communication,” Paper presented at
the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication
and Conflict, 31 AugUst 2005, pp. 10-11, available online at
<www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf>
40
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… the method of communication is itself a reflection of American values
[emphases in original]. The medium, as Marshall McLuhan said, is the message.
We, as Americans, do not dictate. Rather, we believe that, in a free and open
discussion, the best ideas will prevail, and we want to encourage the free
expression of views… [O]ur mission then … is to use the tools of ideological
engagement – words, deeds, and images – to create an environment hostile to
violent extremism [latter emphasis added].41

What various modes of digital engagement share is an emphasis on audience
participation; people actively taking part in constructing their own truths but in contexts
or environments crafted to promote particular kinds of truth. This emphasis on
experiential involvement and relationships echoes what has been called a medium theory
approach generally and McLuhan’s version of it more specifically. “At the heart of
medium theory,” explains Ronald Deibert, “is the argument that changes in the mode of
communication … have an important effect on the trajectory of social evolution…
Medium theory traces these effects to the properties of the medium itself regardless of the
content or the message being transmitted.”42 In other words, how human beings relate to
one another and how we do things – constituting the contexts of how we think and act –
are just as important (if not more important) than what we say (that is, the articulated
James Glassman, “Strategic Public Diplomacy,” Testimony Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, 10
March 2010, available online at
<http://mountainrunner.Us/2010/03/jim_glassmans_testimony_before/>
42
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content of our communications). “It is the medium,” writes McLuhan, “that shapes and
controls the scale and form of human association and action.”43
There were two foundational theorists of medium theory – the early twentieth
century political economist Harold Innis and, after his death in 1952, McLuhan. For both,
media – broadly defined to include a range of technologies, organizations and institutions
– are assessed as the environments through which people engage in all kinds of cultural,
political, and economic interactions. How these environments are structured facilitate
some ways of thinking and acting over others. It is McLuhan’s version of medium theory
that has become the better known of the two. In fact, much of what now constitutes
‘common sense’ for many American proponents of digital communications tends to
parrot a generally optimistic interpretation of McLuhan’s work. For example, in
interviews and statements, Obama appointee Judith McHale reiterates Bush appointee
Glassman’s ‘medium is the message’ approach to public diplomacy claiming, repeatedly,
that the United States wants to “create an environment in which people can debate...”44
Sarah Labowitz, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, similarly argues that America’s ‘internet freedom’ agenda rests on one core
premise: the internet should be “an open public space” – a space to be protected and
promoted rather than used as a tool for specific objectives.45 This approach, particularly
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in light of McLuhan’s original work (elaborated below), reveals a naive or disingenuous
view that the internet constitutes a neutral mediator of inherently progressive and
cooperative human relations.46
Arguably, McLuhan’s status as an (in)famous 1960s public intellectual and,
paradoxically, the ambiguities that surround his writings help to explain such imprecise
interpretations. Although it seems unlikely that many officials have read McLuhan
directly, his work resonates in part because his analysis of electronic communications
appears to be more relevant today than it was fifty years ago. The first speech on ‘internet
freedom,’ delivered by Secretary Clinton in January 2010, for instance, is full of allusions
to McLuhan. When she states that “[t]he spread of information networks is forming a
new nervous system for our planet” one is reminded of McLuhan’s claim that electronic
communication constitutes “the extension of our central nervous system.”47

McLuhan’s Sensorium, His Global Village, and United States Foreign Policy

As Roy Revie puts it, divorcing ‘internet freedom’ from its strategic mandate is “akin
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For McLuhan the history of media (broadly defined) is a history of human beings
extending themselves physically and mentally. Mechanical innovations, he says,
empower humanity’s control over space (through, for example, railways) and time (for
example, the mechanical clock) yet, in so doing, our sense of community and balance is
fractured. As media extend what we do they modify how we think. This is less an
intellectual process than it is sensual. For him, media modify people by reshaping their
perceptive capacities. What he referred to as the golden age of manuscript culture, for
instance, was characterized by a state of (relative) balance among our senses. This, for
McLuhan, was a time and place (in parts of medieval Europe) where inter-personal
dialogue and independent abstract thinking through literacy co-existed, at least for a
small minority. The result was a mediating environment in which a deep sense of
understanding was accommodated through orality while logical reasoning also was
facilitated through writing. However, with the emergence of the printing press (whose
products flourished through the dynamic of capitalism), this balance was disrupted.
McLuhan proposed the sensorium to denote the interaction of our senses.48 At any
given place and time, it is characterized by a ratio among them. The eye (or sight)
perceives space in mostly linear, connected, and serial ways; visual space tends to be
continuous and controllable, impelling people to think about things (including other
people and nature) as manageable objects detached from the viewer. This capacity to
distance oneself – to objectify and manage – is, of course, essential for scientific and
rational thinking. In McLuhan’s mind, the most important contribution made by the
printing press was not its use in promoting literacy and the sharing of information.
48
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Instead, the importance of print lay in its impact on the sensorium. Together, printing and
the alphabet constituted the environment through which individualization, specialization,
and rationalism became cultural norms in Europe.
The ear by contrast is attuned to (or accommodates) an acoustic space – a space
that is hard to control and objectify. In addition to its relatively unmanageable and
continuous characteristics, the auditory tends to be simultaneous and everywhere; it is
both outside and inside our heads and, as such, it undermines the use of sight to order
things. “We shape our tools,” said McLuhan, “and thereafter our tools shape us.”49
According to Robert Babe, McLuhan’s approach “stems in large part from his
analysis of perception and his concern for effects. Media … may extend or amplify one
or other of the senses, increasing thereby the relative importance of that perceptor in the
sensorium.”50 Furthermore, such sensory extensions interact bi-directionally with media
environments. The media we create, once in use, influence us, impelling people to favor
some extensions and senses over others. Usually these effects are not perceived precisely
because they are integral in shaping how people think. On this point, McLuhan references
the Greek myth of Narcissus to emphasize that humanity tends to be mesmerized by its
own capabilities. We are, he says, generally unable to recognize our extensions and, thus,
our sensory orientations. In his interview in Playboy magazine, McLuhan explained this
observation as follows:

It's a process rather like that which occurs to the body under shock or stress
conditions, or to the mind in line with the Freudian concept of repression. I call
49
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this peculiar form of self-hypnosis Narcissus narcosis, a syndrome whereby man
remains unaware of the psychic and social effects of his new technology. ... As a
result, precisely at the point where a new media-induced environment becomes all
pervasive and transmogrifies our sensory balance, it also becomes invisible.51

Given how fundamental the sensorium is in McLuhan’s work, it is doubtful,
despite his sometimes outlandish and contradictory statements, that he believed humanity
could build a truly harmonious transnational society, at least not one preceded by the
peaceful evolution of inter-cultural understanding. While it is true that McLuhan
anticipates the eventual formulation of a “cosmic consciousness” (as discussed below),
this almost metaphysical state arguably can only emerge after the reactionary and violent
global village runs its course. Having said this, such prognostications were meant to
provoke more than inform. For the most part, rather than presenting some kind of
analytical roadmap, McLuhan insisted that such assertions – which he called “probes” –
constitute intellectual challenges crafted to compel his contemporaries to awaken from
their Narcissistic tendencies.
With the telegraph, McLuhan said that human relations were liberated from
mechanized forms of organization involving the dominance of the eye. For example, a
multiplicity of times emerged within various spatial configurations as new electronic
extensions facilitated the resurgence of listening and the ear. To illustrate this, McLuhan
used the example of modern travel. What he refers to as the “railway medium”
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accelerated and expanded human capacities, enabling large cities, new economic patterns,
and unprecedented social formations – transformations of space and time seemingly
“independent of the freight or content” being carried.52 Rail travel also, he said,
accommodated sociality and dialogue among passengers. The airplane further opened up
non-linear space-time capabilities. When sitting on an airplane, McLuhan argued, people
are “suspended in a kind of time zone” in which spatial references – such as where you
are in relation to other places and times – are more open to various interpretations.53
Air travel anticipated still more complex space-time dynamics in the electrical
age. The implications of new media – from the telegraph to the telephone, from radio to
television, and now, decades after McLuhan’s death, the internet – go well beyond the
impact of the information transmitted. The electric galaxy, he proclaimed, mediates new
freedoms of movement, association, and thought. Relatively ordered interactions will be
eclipsed by multifaceted relationships and realities. Spaces and times in this global
village will become ever more heterogeneous and overlapping.
For McLuhan, however, the media themselves are “constitutive of both the idiom
and the character of citizenship and debate.”54 The medium is the message, and media –
the institutions, organizations and technologies we construct and use – have implications
as environments. These environments are affecting, particularly in relation to humanity’s
sense of space and time, and, to repeat, their influence is profound largely because we are
unaware of these effects. Most analysts of media focus on content and use. McLuhan,
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however, warns that such foci are like “the juicy piece of meat that the burglar carries to
distract the watchdog of the mind.”55
To quote Elliot Schrage once more, Facebook and other such platforms
interconnect people in ways that imply “a whole new level of accountability.” Just as his
company “creates a real premium on authenticity,”56 online participatory relationships
mediate, it is assumed, new or modified truths – truths that are relatively powerful
precisely because they are communicated through a dialogue with trusted associates
(often involving images that reaffirm the axiom ‘seeing is believing’). But what of
McLuhan’s more abstract assertion – that content and information exchange are
secondary to the impact of the media environment on the sensorium?

Electricity points the way to an extension of the process of consciousness itself,
on a world scale, and without any verbalization… The computer, in short,
promises by technology a … universal understanding and unity. … The condition
of ‘weightlessness,’ that biologists say promises a physical immortality, may be
paralleled by the condition of speechlessness that could confer a perpetuity of
collective harmony and peace.57

This and similar statements may appear to be wholly optimistic. A more careful
reading, however, reveals a more ambiguous – if not dystopian – vision. In fact, the more
one delves into McLuhan the clearer it becomes that the global village is not an ideal
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place to live. For one thing, it is a world of accelerating discontinuities inducing what
McLuhan called “the Age of Anxiety.”58 Electric technologies, he says, reassert aspects
of pre-modern acoustic culture. Like these pre-literate (and pre-individualistic) societies,
the interdependencies of humanity will become increasingly apparent.59 Nevertheless, the
causal relationships and sense of individual responsibility that were norms during the
industrial age – through the dominance of the eye – will become elusive.60
With digital technologies and, with them, an increasing volume of information
being disseminated in ways seemingly divorced from cost, the pre-modern ability to
listen with care is eclipsed. This, primarily, is the outcome of mounting time pressures
and, of course, information overload. In this environment, neither the balancing of the
senses idealized by McLuhan (for example, the medieval person’s use of both eye and ear
to intimately inter-connect and objectively reason), nor relatively modern strategies for
making sense of things (isolating a problem, studying it in detail, and coming up with
logically coherent solutions) are probable. In the electric age, to make timely decisions,
McLuhan recognizes that people are required to make sense of the world by reacting
rather than analyzing as “action and reaction [now] occur [virtually] at the same time.”61
When media are understood to be ‘the message’ rather than merely the conveyors
of messages, the public sphere ideal – as implied in Clinton’s references to a ‘Civil
Society 2.0’ – is rendered infeasible. Unlike the world envisioned in the Obama
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administration’s calls for ‘internet freedom,’ in McLuhan’s global village people relate
and act more through emotion, intuition, and a reactionary mindset rather than discussion,
deliberation, and reflection.

McLuhan’s Dark Vision

McLuhan sometimes described the global village as more machine than community. This
is because of its impersonal scale, ever-accelerating norms and, increasingly, the absence
of reflexive human agency. More directly, and antithetical to what Hillary Clinton
implies when she refers to “information networks” as “a new nervous system for our
planet,” McLuhan views this emerging transnational society to be a profoundly alienating
place, paradoxically because of humanity’s extensions.62 To reiterate, not only do our
media creations extend us, they change us. Often, says McLuhan, the price we pay to
amplify is the numbing of relevant senses. The automobile, for example, dramatically
extends our spatial reach but we pay a price in that our intimate connection with the land
is eradicated (a connection we possessed when we only walked). The mechanical clock
frees us from the natural flow of time but also it severs us from the earth’s ecological
rhythms. Ultimately, he says, the reach or power enabled by our extensions entails a cost.
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More paradoxically still (and in keeping with his dialectical but sometimes selfcontradictory thinking), McLuhan postulated that this alienation and mechanization of
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The aloof and dissociated role of the literate man of the Western world is
succumbing to the new, intense depth participation engendered by the electronic
media and bringing us back in touch with ourselves as well as with one another.
But the instant nature of electric-information movement is decentralizing – rather
than enlarging – the family of man into a new state of multitudinous tribal
existences. Particularly in countries where literate values are deeply
institutionalized, this is a highly traumatic process, since the clash of the old
segmented visual culture and the new integral electronic culture creates a crisis of
identity, a vacuum of the self, which generates tremendous violence.63

Thus, when McLuhan refers to a “process of consciousness” without
“verbalization” (and one in which “speechlessness” becomes essential to humanity’s
“harmony”), he is not anticipating a world in which truths are formulated in thoughtful or
reflexive ways. Instead, people are interlinked inside an electronic membrane that
compels an accelerating universalization of shared immediacies.64
Whether United States officials view digital technologies as tools or mediating
spaces, there is little opposition to the assertion that ‘internet freedom’ is “a major foreign
policy priority”65 despite McLuhan’s view that the planet is becoming interlinked more
through sensations than thoughtful connections (in fact, McLuhan originally called the
global village a global theater). Because these sensations are multi-planed and anxiety63
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ridden, more than just cultures remain divided – individuals will “create their own
spaces.”66 For McLuhan, the sensual implications of electronic forms of engagement
generate an altogether contradictory outcome: disengagement.
McLuhan likely would have assessed both digital engagement and ‘internet
freedom’ as components of a more general media ecology that itself (at least during the
transition from the removed-and-rational to the interconnected-and-sensual) undermines
understanding. Through speed, information overload, and intellectual fragmentation, the
capacity to converse and reflect are subjected to a traumatic transformation – a
transformation from institutions that reflect visual and literate industrial society (one pole
of McLuhan’s visual-auditory dialectic) to a global culture characterized by moment-tomoment sensory intimacies. McLuhan, however, is not entirely pessimistic. As he told
Playboy, “We live in a transitional era of profound pain and tragic identity quest, but the
agony of our age is the labor pain of rebirth.”67
To comprehend these seemingly inconsistent prognostications arguably
McLuhan’s Catholic faith emboldened him to predict that through the maelstrom of
change and destruction the human race could be re-born and the world re-formed. Thus at
least some of the simplifications and contradictions found in McLuhan’s work make
sense, at least in his own mind. “Psychic communal integration” he proclaimed, becomes
“possible at last by the electronic media... In a Christian sense, this is merely a new
interpretation of the mystical body of Christ; and Christ, after all, is the ultimate
extension of man.”68
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Faith (or mysticism) aside, medium theory itself illuminates our understanding of
why American officials find it so difficult to recognize the contradictory nature of their
policy responses to anti-Americanism. Following McLuhan, the marketing ontology now
informing public diplomacy itself constitutes an affecting medium – one that normalizes
the notion that anti-American extremism is a problem best managed through the lens of
measurable indices and opinions rather than historically-generated power asymmetries
and sensual-intellectual capacities.69
The questions posed by Žižek at the beginning of this paper have still further
resonance in the context of McLuhan’s sensorium. The irony of Washington foreign
policy officials utilizing aurally-biased technologies to achieve visually-oriented ‘realist’
goals surely would not have escaped him.70 We thus might well consider it to be absurd
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that a linear, rationally calculated foreign policy now is embracing the very tools that
McLuhan believed would mediate a global village dominated by reactionary
irrationalities. Despite the “new extensions of man and the environment they generate, ...
we still cannot free ourselves of the delusion that it is how a medium is used that counts,
rather than what it does to us and with us. This,” McLuhan argued, “is the zombie stance
of the technological idiot.”71

Conclusion

Now, ultimately, this issue isn’t just about information freedom; it is about what
kind of world we want and what kind of world we will inhabit. It’s about whether
we live on a planet with one internet, one global community, and a common body
of knowledge that benefits and unites us all, or a fragmented planet in which
access to information and opportunity is dependent on where you live and the
whims of censors.72

This excerpt from Secretary Clinton’s first ‘internet freedom’ speech raises a number of
concerns. For careful readers of McLuhan, references to the emergence of “a common
body of knowledge that benefits and unites” are difficult to comprehend.73

McLuhan, “Playboy Interview.”
Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,”
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>
73
Again, I recognize that McLuhan can be read as an optimist, particularly in light of his
anticipation of some kind of cosmic consciousness. It is, however, his dystopian outlook
that compelled his reflexive analysis. “No one could be less enthusiastic about these
radical changes than myself,” he said. “The extensions of man’s consciousness induced
71
72

30

If, as many State Department officials argue, digital technologies can empower
citizens, surely our review of McLuhan compels us to seek more specificity. For one
thing, what kind of empowerment is this – the power to receive and disseminate
information any place, any time, or is it the power to probe, discuss, and reflect through
intellectually engaged forms of decision-making? Of course another question triggered by
Washington’s enthusiasm for its own ‘21st Century Statecraft’ involves ‘realist’ concerns
about this empowerment and its implied implosion of international power; shifting power
away from state regimes into the hands of citizens. If the populations of Egypt, Libya,
Syria (or, one day, Saudi Arabia) truly are transformed into autonomous, reflexive
citizens, how might they act on these sovereign capabilities? Answering such questions
has not been a priority for American officials probably because implicit and explicit
references to McLuhan’s concepts have been under-theorized (or perhaps disingenuously
applied).
If there is even a kernel of plausibility in McLuhan’s dark vision, we should ask
what stabilizing, consensus-building mechanisms feasibly can counter-balance a global
civil society in which a nervous system-integrated (yet alienated) world faces two
dystopian futures: one in which governance becomes little more than a state of perpetual
action-and-reaction or one in which the extensions that link us together are, in effect,
amputated? The former raises problems concerning continuity and stability while the
latter suggests a future dominated by various forms of chauvinism and extremism.
by the electric media could conceivably usher in the millennium, but it also holds the
potential for realizing the Anti-Christ... Cataclysmic environmental changes such as these
are, in and of themselves, morally neutral; it is how we perceive them and react to them
that will determine their ultimate psychic and social consequences. If we refuse to see
them at all, we will become their servants [emphases added]. McLuhan, “Playboy
Interview.”
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Despite the ambiguities and leaps of logic that pervade McLuhan’s writings, by
probing the complexities of his foundational concepts, we are empowered to critique the
assumptions underlying current American policies; globally influential policies informed,
it appears, by misinformed applications and delusional simplifications.
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